Morality has been one of the central topics of philosophy since its emergence, with thinkers of all cultures and ages articulating different points of view on what counts as a moral life and whether morality is subjective or objective. In essence, morality refers to principles concerning right and wrong behavior, questions regarding what people ought to do, and matters with respect to how individuals should treat other persons. The nature of morality, however, is deeply contested: Is morality an objective truth, or is it structured by individual perspectives, cultures, and emotions? Secondly, why do some but not others receive censure? In seeking to explain this, the essay will examine philosophical positions on morality-those that debate whether morality is objective or subjective-and discuss the intricacies involved in moral judgment.
One of the most perpetual debates in moral philosophy rests on whether morality is objective-that is, whether there exist some moral principles that are true and valid for all people-or subjective, where morality becomes a matter of personal or cultural opinion. Those who believe in moral objectivism, such as Immanuel Kant and Plato, think that moral truths exist independent of human opinions. For example, Kant believed in a universal moral law, called the "categorical imperative." This is a doctrine that holds an action to be morally right if it can be willed universally, where respect for the dignity of all rational beings and regard for persons as ends in themselves, rather than means to an end, are observed. In that respect, Kant held the view that morality is based upon reason and can be found through rational thought hence objective and binding upon all people.
On the contrary, Plato believed that moral truths exist in the realm of the "Forms"-perfect, eternal concepts which surpass the physical world. In his dialogues, Plato said that concepts like justice, goodness, and virtue have objective reality that humans can grasp through philosophical reflection. Therefore, morality is not a matter of personal opinion or of cultural tradition but rather the discovery of those eternal truths. The objectivist insists that moral principles are timeless and universal, applying to everyone regardless of circumstance.
By contrast, moral subjectivism holds that morality is not absolute but relative and subjective, a product of individual feelings and sentiments and of group mores. This view holds that what is right and wrong differs between the individual and society, and not a single standard exists that applies to all human beings. Philosophers like David Hume held the conviction that morality is not founded on objective reason but in human sentiment and emotion. In this regard, moral judgments according to Hume show approval or disapproval concerning how the actions in question make us feel. That would mean that morality is subjective: what one individual believes to be morally right may be different from what another individual finds acceptable, and neither is objectively right or wrong.
Another variety of moral subjectivism is cultural relativism. This claims that morality is descriptive of the norms, customs, and way of life of particular societies: what one culture considers moral, another culture may consider immoral. For example, practices such as arranged marriages or the death penalty might be morally tolerable in one culture but utterly abhorrent in another. In this case, the cultural relativist would say that there can be no universal standard for evaluating the rightness or wrongness of cultures since, after all, morality is a creation of culture itself.
The strongest of arguments for moral subjectivism comes from the varied moral beliefs and practices throughout the world. One would think that if morality were objective, then people everywhere would agree on at least basic moral principles. History and anthropology, however, show great variation in moral codes. While one society may regard a certain practice as morally acceptable, another may consider that same practice as being deeply immoral. This thus indicates that moral values are shaped by social, historical, and environmental factors.
But another point that the tension between moral objectivism and subjectivism raises is why we judge some people but not others. Moral judgment encompasses an appraisal on whether one's actions conform to moral standards and a judgment on whether one is morally blameworthy or praiseworthy. And such a process is indeed multifactorial in nature, inasmuch as personal biases, social norms, even emotional responses determine it. People tend to stand in judgment of others who have violated widely accepted moral codes within their community or culture; however, they do not necessarily stand in judgment of people who either uphold the culture or who are judged with empathy and/or understanding.
One reason we judge some people and not others is that moral standards are often culturally or contextually based. For instance, in a society where honesty is upheld to the highest degree, the more censoring of people who lie or deceive will be, in comparison with another society where to be slick and deceive others is an accomplished trait that ensures survival. Social norms come into play in heavily influencing moral judgments; indeed, upon violation of these social norms, people are often judged as immoral. On the other hand, an action that is in conformation with society or can be justified by the societal norms is not judged even if in a different setting it would have been morally wrong.
Another important factor that plays a pivotal role in moral judgments is empathy. People are more likely to excuse or forgive the actions of those they understand or emotionally relate to. For example, whereas some individuals may perform an action that is taken as being morally questionable, they can be perceived as acting in mitigation, such as out of desperation or under extreme duress, and hence their action would not be judged particularly severely. This would prove that our judgments against other people are never based on objective moral principles in the normal course of life but based on how their case affects us emotionally.
We are all less judgmental against those who are in the same social group or community we are in. As maintained by psychological evidence, humans have a tendency to like those who are similar to themselves in ethnicity, culture, or social identity. This whole phenomenon is known as "in-group favoritism," wherein people make more charitable moral judgments for one of their in-group members and more severe judgments against those who are not part of their in-group. People will more readily excuse the actions of those whom they consider to be within their group, judging more severely those outside the group even when identical action has occurred:.
That does raise a very serious question in moral philosophy: how can we call morality objective if at times our moral judgments depend upon our emotions, social setting, and biases? Some philosophers, including Bernard Williams, believe that most moral judgments are subjective since they take into consideration personal points of view, cultural backgrounds, and historical context. But that does not necessarily imply that all moral judgments are of equal value. Yet such at least is the implication-even though morality may thus be situational, critical reflective debate and public deliberation can nevertheless check against unjust practices and flesh out more coherent and consistent moral principles.
Finally, one of the central questions of philosophy is whether morality is objective or subjective. Objectivists argue that moral precepts are rooted in reason and universal truths, while subjectivists believe morality is something made and developed by individuals' perceptions, emotions, and cultures. Social norms, empathy, and group identity help reinforce how others tend to be judged, and quite often this puts us in the position of being sometimes judgmental of some people and excusing others. Ultimately, much of the difficulty in coming to an understanding of moral judgment requires consideration of both the universality and subjectivity of morality, in light of how human nature, social setting, and emotional response mold our moral beliefs and actions.
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